Sumber : Infobank
WHISPERS about the massive bonuses of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) directors and commissioners have suddenly become an open discussion. It’s not the amount that’s the problem, but rather how those hefty bonuses are earned. Some companies with mediocre performance or even declining performance as reflected by plunging stock prices, rising non-performing loans in banks, and weakening provisions still report strong profits. The truth? These are inflated profits, carefully engineered.
Dony Oskaria has shed light on the schemes used by SOE directors to secure large bonuses. According to the Chief Operating Officer of the Sovereign Wealth Fund or as known as Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara Indonesia), these directors, often with the approval of commissioners are suspected of manipulating financials to present a falsely positive bottom line.
However, in the long run, these profits do not reflect a healthy enterprise. They are artificial gains. Dony criticized the practice of overstating earnings, such as by deferring expenses solely to improve the bottom line followed, of course, by hefty bonuses (tantiem).
“In my view, that is manipulation and it’s what causes companies to collapse,”
Dony said at the IKA Fikom Unpad Executive Breakfast Meeting held at Hutan Kota by Plataran, Jakarta, on Wednesday (June 18, 2025). He pointed out that many SOEs failed in the past due to a lack of long term vision and weak operational oversight.
While Dony refrained from naming specific companies, the pattern is evident, even among state owned banks. For example, some show plunging stock prices, rising NPLs, only marginal profit growth, and shrinking provisions, yet their bonus allocations soar. This is the dangerous anomaly he warns about: profits appear to rise, but they’re deceptive fabricated solely to justify large bonuses.
Adding to the concern is a recent trend, deputy ministers (Wakil Menteri or Wamen) being appointed as commissioners in SOEs. According to research from Infobank Research Bureau (birI), there are currently 25 deputy ministers serving as SOE commissioners. That number is expected to grow. Under President Prabowo, there are 56 deputy ministers in the Cabinet. This excludes politicians who resign from their parties to assume commissioner roles.
The government claims this dual role is intended to align SOE programs with national policies. Legally, the practice is not prohibited, since the Constitutional Court only bans ministers, not deputy ministers from holding dual roles. Still, the question remains: Do these deputy ministers truly have enough capacity to carry out their governmental duties while also serving as commissioners? Or is the dual role more about access to generous bonuses and perks?
This is the crux of Dony Oskaria’s critique, can such a dual role be healthy for SOEs? One foot in the cabinet, one in the boardroom both aimed at collecting lucrative bonuses.
Back to the issue of profit engineering as a gateway to oversized bonuses. It is clear we are witnessing a dangerous anomaly: bonuses being handed out without sound fundamentals. Available data highlight contradictions in the current remuneration system contradictions that violate the core principles of compensation, where rewards must be aligned with both risk and performance.
Why is this happening? Likely because of fragile governance structures. Systemic conflicts of interest persist. The presence of deputy ministers in commissioner roles risks becoming a rubber stamp for directors engineered financials. Many observers argue that these deputy ministers lack the qualifications to act as proper commissioners. Rather than acting as independent overseers, they often end up legitimizing questionable practices.
Ideally, the presence of deputy ministers in SOEs should help curb moral hazards and financial misconduct. The government, as the majority shareholder, must lead reforms before a crisis of confidence unfolds. Bonuses are not inherently wrong but they must come with a proportionate level of responsibility.
Therefore, the bonus system must be reformed. If necessary, an independent forensic audit should be conducted to assess whether bonuses match real performance, and to investigate possible profit mark-ups. Personal sanctions should follow any findings of financial manipulation.
Let us hope that the inclusion of deputy ministers in SOE structures will lead to uncovering not enabling the manipulation of profits and bonuses. But frankly, few are optimistic. Many suspect this trend is more about enjoying privileges and fat bonuses. That said, the revelations from Dony Oskaria about profit engineering and bonus manipulation must be taken seriously and supported by meaningful reforms.
Dony Oskaria has shed light on the schemes used by SOE directors to secure large bonuses. According to the Chief Operating Officer of the Sovereign Wealth Fund or as known as Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara Indonesia), these directors, often with the approval of commissioners are suspected of manipulating financials to present a falsely positive bottom line.
